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ABSTRACT
User Profiling in GUI based Windows Systems for Intrusion Detection
by Arshi Agrawal
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying any unauthorized access to a sys-
tem. This process inspects user behavior to identify any possible attack or intrusion.
There exists two type of intrusion detection systems (IDSs): signature-based IDS and
anomaly-based IDS.
This project concentrates on anomaly-based intrusion detection technique. This
technique is based on the deviation of intruder’s actions from the authenticated user’s
actions. Much previous research has focused on the deviation of command line input
in UNIX systems. However, these techniques fail to detect attacks on modern GUI-
based systems, where typical user activities include mouse movements and keystrokes.
Our project aims to create a dataset suitable for testing intrusion detection strate-
gies on GUI-based operating systems. We have developed an event logging tool to
capture GUI-based user data on Windows systems. We have collected a large dataset
which we analyze using a intrusion detection strategy based on hidden Markov models
(HMM).
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
An intruder is an attacker who impersonates a legitimate user to perform some
illegitimate activity on the user’s computer system. In general, the intrusion detection
systems observes the ongoing activities on the system and compare it with the user’s
normal activities to identify malicious behavior or an intrusion [6].
This project considers intrusion detection techniques based on anomaly-based
intrusion detection [13]. In anomaly based detection systems, a model is generated
based on normal user behavior. This model is then compared with the user activities
during the detection phase, and any deviation is considered to be an anomoly or
a possible attack. In genereal, a threshold value is used to determine the extent
of deviation, based on which an anomaly is considered as a possible attack or an
intrusion.
The intrusion detection technique used in this paper is also based on the deviation
of intruder’s actions from the authentic user’s actions. In order to trace this deviation,
we built user profiles by collecting and processing data from user sessions. This
data was used to train user behavior model, to recognize the deviations from the
normal behavior. The resulting model is then used to detect any malicious activity
or intrusion. The detection mechanism becomes more difficult when the intruder is
able to mimic the legitimate user’s behavior to a large extent. In this paper, we
consider a intrusion detection technique based on hidden Markov models (HMM).
There has been much research in the field of anomaly-based intrusion detection.
Much of the previous research focused on Unix-like systems and relied on command
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line activities for intrusion detection [6, 13]. However, these techniques are not directly
applicable to modern GUI-based systems, where typical user activities include mouse
movements and keystrokes. Thus, command line data alone cannot efficiently detect
intrusion attacks on such systems [4].
In this paper, we discuss an event logging tool that we developed. This tool
has been used to capture a significant amount of GUI-based user data for Windows
systems. We then analyze the effectiveness of an HMM-based intrusion detection
technique on our collected data.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous research done
on intrusion detection and relevant background information for our research. Chap-
ter 3 considers data capture in a GUI environment and provides details on the data
capturing tool that we have developed. Chapter 4 discusses our HMM-based detec-
tor. In Chapter 5 we give results for the HMM-based detector when applied to data
collected from a GUI environment. Finally, in Chapter 6 we provide our conclusions
and discuss possible directions for future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
The anomaly-based intrusion detection problem has been an area of research in
the field of security for a very long time now. Therefore, it is important to get an
overview of the previous research done in this area.
2.1 Introduction
Consumers and businesses spend billions of dollar every year for implementing
various computer security measures. More and more start-ups, and other companies
are trying to propose new approaches to computer security [21]. Even after the
presence of many advanced security measures, username and password are still the
most common authentication measures used by modern computer systems. These
systems that use such trivial authentication measures are more prone to intrusions,
as such credentials can be easily compromised to an insider. When an insider uses
the compromised but legitimate credentials to gain access to the computer system
of a user, the detection of the attack becomes extremely difficult. Anomaly-based
intrusion attacks are considered to be difficult to detect as unlike signature-based
detection techniques, here there are no known pattern (signature) of the attacks. The
attackers use technically legal and legitimate means to get access to the system [9, 27].
The information used to detect intrusion attacks is contained in the actions of
the intruder. This set of actions, considered as behavior profile of users forms the
basis of intrusion detection system (IDS). IDSs monitor the activities occuring on the
computer system and look for the malicious or unusual activities [5]. Signature-based
detection and anomaly-based detection are the two approaches used by intrusion
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detection systems.
Signature-based detection systems are useful in identifying known attacks where
the IDS looks for a predetermined pattern that represents an attack. If the system
finds a match in the pattern, it identifies the attack and raises the alarm. However,
this type of detection technique is not useful in detecting unknown attacks. Anomaly-
based detection systems compare the ongoing user activities to the user’s normal
behavior model. Any deviation from the behavior model is considered a possible
attack [13]. To make the distinction between the normal user behavior and the
intruder’s behavior, the detection system collects user data to build user profiles.
This data is then trained for the detection system to understand what is normal and
to identify the malicious behavior.
2.2 Intrusion Detection
Schonlau dataset is considered to be the first important accomplishment on the
problem of intrusion detection. In his paper, Schonlau collected a dataset based
on Unix command line data of 50 users for testing and comparing various intrusion
detection methods [23]. However, as this dataset was based solely on command line
data, it was not useful to represent users working on graphical user interface (GUI)
based operating systems such as Microsoft Windows and Linux. This is due to the
reason that command line data does not capture user’s actions such as mouse or
keyboard activities, which would determine user’s behavior on these systems more
accurately.
Some researchers used Schonlau dataset to detect intrusion attacks using various
techniques [5]. There also exists a lot of research work in the area of masquerade
detection, which is a specific case of anomaly-based intrusion detection [3, 4, 9, 17].
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Research has been carried to compare the techniques used for intrusion detection [13].
According to the existing research, there are seven general approaches to anomaly-
based intrusion detection (precisely, masquerade detection). These are summarized
as follows [3, 13]:
• Information-theoretic - This approach is based on the theory that commands
issued by the legitimate user will compress more than those issued by the in-
truder. However, this theory failed to give any promising results.
• Text mining - This is a data mining approach where repetitive command se-
quences are extracted from the training data and are used for scoring.
• Hidden Markov model (HMM) - This is the technique used in our paper and is
discussed in detail in the following subsection.
• Naive Bayes - This technique is based on the frequency of commands, and does
not take any sequence in consideration.
• Sequence and bioinformatics - This approach relies completely on extracting
sequence related information.
• Support vector machines (SVM) - This is a machine learning algorithm used
to separate data points by mapping the points in the original space to a high
dimensional space. This mapping to a high dimensional space makes the sepa-
ration easier, and is useful for classification and regression analysis.
• Other approaches - This category comprises of the approaches that do not
fit into any of the above categories. These approaches were used by different
researchers at different intervals of time. For instance, a hybrid Bayes one step
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Markov approach and a hybrid multi step Markov approach [23]. Also, some
researchers tried to improve the above techniques by combining them [2].
With the advent of GUI-based operating systems, researchers started to argue
about the importance of similar dataset as Schonlau’s dataset, but based on user
actions in GUI-based environment. Different researchers used different approaches to
the common problem of intrusion detection.
There exists research that models user behavior based on mouse movements [11,
12, 22]. Here the authors used the data collection technique in a controlled environ-
ment where users were asked to view same web pages by using Internet Explorer.
However, this approach resulted in a large false positive and negative rates. Simi-
larly, there were algorithms proposed for anomaly-based intrusion detection, based on
the user’s typing patterns [19, 25]. Authors considered characteristics such as typing
speed, accuracy and inter-character delays for proposing this type of algorithm [15].
However, the algorithm required a two-way communication between server and client,
for the validation of the login. This algorithm used a parameter termed criterion fac-
tor and reduced the false positive to a large extent. But the use of another parameter
was not very clear from the paper.
There have also been several efforts of user behavior profiling methods by moni-
toring system calls, analyzing audit logs and program execution traces. These meth-
ods used call stack information for anomaly detection [8].
Although modeling of user behavior based on above criterias was able to detect
intrusion attacks on GUI-based systems to a certain extent, the user profile created
did not completely take all user actions into account. As a next step in this research
area, a framework was proposed for collecting user behavior based on mouse activity,
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typing speed as well as background processes [9]. The authors used binary classifica-
tion problem for user identification and intrusion detection, and used support vector
machine for learning and classifying user profile parameter sets. The technique was
claimed to have a high detection rate with few false positives. However, the dataset
was not made available to public due to copyright issues.
On the similar research line, researchers extended the work by using other de-
tection techniques in combination with the use of GUI manipulations for the iden-
tification. Researchers used Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) as a basis for iden-
tification [14], Another framework called USim was also proposed, which generates
user behavior data based on parameters like user intentions, user skill level, set of
applications installed on a machine, mouse movement and keyboard activity [10].
All these research work contributed in providing useful frameworks and tech-
niques for anomaly-based intrusion detection in GUI-based operating systems, and
provided us with their useful research knowledge and findings. However, still the
pace of research work in this area of intrusion detection is seriously hampered due to
the lack of a publicly available dataset that can be trained to find efficient detection
techniques. We aim to solve this problem by providing with such dataset. Also, we
will use Hidden Markov model for identification and intrusion detection.
2.3 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden markov model (HMM) is a machine learning technique that is based on
markov chains. In a machine learning technique, an algorithm is trained with samples
of previous data and this trained data is used to get some feedback for unknown
cases [18]. The data used for training purposes need to be sufficient to get a proper
feedback for different cases.
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Table 1: HMM Notations dataset
Symbol Description
T length of the observation sequence
N number of states in the model
M number of observation symbols
Q distinct states of the Markov process
V set of possible observations 0, 1, ...., M-1
X hidden state sequence (X0, X1, ...., XT−1)
A state transition probability matrix
B observation probability matrix
pi initial state distribution
O observation sequence (O0, O1, ....., OT−1)
λ Hidden markov model, where λ = (A,B,pi)
In markov chains the states are visible to the observer, while in hidden markov
model the states are hidden from the observer. HMM is a finite state model, which
has state transition probabilities as well as probability distribution over all possible
output symbols in each state [20]. Each hidden state in HMM has two probabilities
associated to them, the transition probability to another state as well as probability
of being in the same state [7].
HMM is trained using a sequence of observations that is termed as training
data. The chosen sequence of states by the model maximizes the probability of the
observation sequences. After the construction of the model, the unknown or test data
is tested to find the similarity between the test data and training data.
2.3.1 Notation
The HMM model can be understood using the notations shown in Table 1 [26].
In general, a hidden markov model can be represented as in Figure 1. The dashed
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line in the figure represents the hidden states of markov process, which are known by
the current state and the matrix A. The observation sequence Oi is the only known
sequence to the observer, which is related to the hidden states and the matrix B.
Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model
2.3.2 The Three Problems
HMM can be used to solve three types of problems [26].
Problem 1. Given the model λ = (A,B,pi) and obesrvation sequence O, find
P(O—λ). We need to score the observed sequence to see how well it fits into the
model λ.
Problem 2. Given the model λ = (A,B,pi) and obesrvation sequence O, find the
optimal hidden state sequence. We need to find the hidden states of the given model.
Problem 3. Given an observation sequence O and number of states in model λ
(N) and number of observable symbols (M), find the model λ= (A,Bpi) that maximizes
the probability of O. We need to train a model for the observed data.
The GUI-based data we collected for this project from a large number of users
is divided into training data and testing data. We choose the data from any one user
(considered as good user) and divide it in two sets. One set of data is used as training
data to train HMM (Problem 3). The second set of good user’s data combined with
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the data from other users (considered as intrusionrs) is used as the testing data. The
HMM is then used to score testing data (Problem 1). A higher score indicates similar
characteristics between training data and testing data, and a lower score indicates
distnction between the two types of data. Thus, we can seperate the intrusionr’s data
from the good user’s data.
2.4 ROC Curves
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a graphical plot that represents
the trade off between true positive rate and false positive rate for every possible
cut off. ROC curves ares used to show the performance of a binary classification
problem where there are two types of outcomes, namely positive and negative [18].
To understand the concept of ROC curve better, let us first understand the possible
outcomes of the binary classification problem.
2.4.1 Possible Outcomes
As discussed above, there are two possible outcomes of a binary classification
problem, either positive (p) or negative (n). Based on these outputs and their pre-
dictions, there can be four combination of the outcomes of the problem, as described
in Figure 2 [28].
1. True positive (TP) - In case of both the prediction as well as the actual outcome
being positive, the outcome is called true positive.
2. False positive (FP) - When the predicted outcome is positive and the actual
outcome is negative, then it is said to be false positive.
3. True negative (TN) - When both the predicted and actual outcome is negative,
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then it is a true negative outcome.
4. False negative (FN) - When the prediction outcome is negative, while the actual
value is positive, then the outcome is false negative.
Figure 2: Possible outcomes
This concept when applied to our project problem, we get two possible outcomes
in the form of user file belonging to either good user or intruder. When a good user
is correctly predicted as good user, then we get a true positive outcome. Similarly,
with intruder correctly predicted as intruder, we get true negative. False positives
and false negatives occur when any of the good user or intruder is misclassified as the
other. These values are, however highly dependent on the threshold value we choose
to distinguish between good user and intruder. Figure 3 shows how the results of the
problem is distributed in typical cases. Here the x axis represents the threshold value,
which is the deciding factor for the amount of overlap between different outcomes.
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Figure 3: Distribution of results with the possible predictions
2.4.2 ROC Curve Analysis
The ROC curve is widely used for diagonostic test ealuation. It is plotted for
true positive rate (TPR) also known as Sensitivity and false positive rate (FPR) also
known as Specificity, for different cut-off points based on threshold values. Each
point on the ROC curve corresponds to a particular decision threshold. Thus it gives
a complete sensitivity/specificity report for a given problem [1, 28].
TPR represents the number of correct positive results among all positive out-
comes available for the given problem. This represents the cases when a intruder is
correctly identified as the intruder. Whereas FPR defines the number of incorrect
positive outcomes among all negative outcomes available for the problem. FPR rep-
resent the cases when a good user is identified as a intruder. TPR and FPR are
calculated as follows:
The ROC curve is plotted with FPR on x-axis and TPR or y-axis. A test with
best prediction gives no false positives and no false negatives i.e. 100% sensitivity
and 100% specificity. This type of test results in a ROC curve that passes through
12
Figure 4: TPR and FPR
the upper left corner (0,1) that represents a higher overall accuracy. On the other
hand, a random guess results in a diagonal line (0.5,0.5) with 50% sensitivity and 50%
specificity. All the tests that gives ROC curve above the diagonal line are considered
to have good results and others point to poor results.
Figure 5: ROC curve
2.4.3 Area Under The Curve (AUC)
AUC is a measure of how well a parameter can distinguish between the two
possible outcomes of the binary classification problem [1]. A perfect prediction of the
results of the given problem gives us an AUC of 1.0.
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CHAPTER 3
Event Logging for GUI-based Systems
Anomaly-based intrusion detection is generally based on the user interaction with
the system. This interaction can be recorded in the form of list of commands issued
by the system on terminal, or the skill level of the user or merely on his/her way of
using a particular aspect of the system (for instance, how to use certain keystroke
combinations or how to use mouse to open certain applications).
Intrusion detection based on command line data will generally involve typing
certain commands with or without specific parameters for a certain purpose. However,
intrusion detection for GUI-based systems for the same purpose may involve a series of
different types of actions by different users. For instance, Table 2 gives a comparison
of command line dataset and GUI-based dataset for two different users trying to find
the contents of a directory in Windows system [9].
Thus, trying to detect intrusions based on user behavior on GUI-based systems
can be more complex as compared from the command line based dataset. This is
due to the fact that command line data gives us the information of what command
is executed, whereas GUI-based behavior data gives us the information of how the
command is executed. Similar to the architecture of anomaly-based intrusion de-
tection based on command line data [13], Figure 6 depicts the basic architecture of
anomaly-based intrusion detection based on GUI interactions of users.
The GUI features taken into account for collecting data in this paper includes
the following higher level interaction of user with the system:
• Mouse interaction
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Table 2: Comparison of Command line dataset and GUI-based dataset
User Command line
dataset
GUI-based dataset
1 dir or ls
[with or without
parameters]
1. Mouse Coordinates (movement)
2. Left Click (on Start menu)
3. Left Click (on Computer folder)
4. Click to open the folder
2 dir or ls
[with or without
parameters]
1. Press Windows key from keyboard
2. Press arrow keys to reach computer folder
3. Press Enter
4. Press arrow keys to reach the desired folder
5. Press Enter
• Keyboard interaction
• Active applications
3.1 Mouse Interaction
The real user data based on mouse interaction of user with the system consists
of various types of lower level interaction. We log this interaction by observing mouse
clicks (left and right) along with the time of event, mouse coordinates and the ap-
plication on which event occurs. Table 3 shows a sample of mouse log file generated
by the event logger. As we can see that double clicks are not listed as a seperate
15
Figure 6: Architecture of anomaly-based intrusion detection based on GUI interac-
tions
category in the table. However, we can observe double left click in the last two en-
tries of the table which have same coordinates and same time stamps for the given
application. This type of detailed data will allow us to extract useful information
about user behavior in relation to mouse and system interaction.
3.2 Keyboard Interaction
Keyboard interaction in GUI-based sytems can give us a variety of behavioral
information. We can not only extract information like typing speed by observing
keyboard interaction, but can also get information about typing pattern of the user,
the use of shortcut keys as a substitute for mouse and other information depending on
the type of application in use and the skill level of the user. Table 4 shows a sample
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Table 3: Sample dataset showing the Mouse Interaction
Mouse
Click
Coordinates
(X,Y)
Time of
event
Application
Left 590,349 May 29
10:14:19
2012
file:///C:/Users/Documents/Visual Stu-
dio 2010/Projects/bin/Debug/LogAc-
tivePrograms.EXE
Right 1268,8 May 29
10:14:24
2012
LogActivePrograms (Running) - Mi-
crosoft Visual C# 2010 Express
Left 1026,87 May 29
10:14:56
2012
mouseLogs.txt - Notepad
Left 1026,87 May 29
10:14:56
2012
mouseLogs.txt - Notepad
dataset collected by the event logger. Like the dataset for mouse interaction, this
dataset also contains information about the time of event and the current application
in use. However, we collecting this dataset for every five seconds, assuming the current
application remains same for those five seconds. The reason for adopting this method
for data collection was to avoid logging keyboard activity for every event. We used a
buffered string which stored the keys pressed for five seconds, and empty the buffer in
log file at the end of the five seconds. This allowed an efficient use of resources by the
logger tool. Moreover, we can also observe from the table that some keys are logged
by the special character * instead of giving information about actual keys pressed.
This allows the user to maintain his/her privacy. The special character represents
alphabetical, numerical characters and space.
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Table 4: Sample dataset showing the Keyboard Interaction
Time of event Keys pressed Application
May 29 10:09:29 2012 *****[SHIFT][TAB]*** Logs.txt - Notepad
May 29 10:09:34 2012 *[CTRL]********** Google - Google Chrome
May 29 10:09:39 2012 [SHIFT]*****[ENTER][ENTER] Google Maps - Google
Chrome
May 29 10:09:44 2012 *****[SHIFT][SHIFT]*** TextPad -
C:/Users/Documents/
report/ chap3.tex
May 29 10:09:49 2012 ***[CAPSLOCK]***[F5]*** LogActivePrograms (Run-
ning) - Microsoft Visual C#
2010 Express
3.3 Active Applications
Getting information about only mouse and keyboard interaction in GUI-based
systems will be incomplete, if we do not take into account the application the user may
be interacting with while using mouse or keyboard. The dataset will be incomplete if
we do not get information about the application on which the user might have clicked
or for which the user may be using the keyboard for. The event logger tool not only
logs the current application that the user is interacting with, but also logs all the
applications that are active during the user session. This information is logged for
every twenty seconds, so that it allows us to know the start and end duration of the
applications. Table 5 shows a sample dataset collected by the event logger for logging
the active applications.
Thus with the help of event logger tool we get the lower level information about
user’s interaction with the system. However, this information cannot be directly used
for creating the dataset that will be trained for the intrusion detection techniques.
This large amount of information need to be filtered to extract useful parameters of
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Table 5: Sample dataset showing the Active Applications
Time of
event
Current Application Active Applications
May 29
10:09:29
2012
TextPad -
C:/Users/Documents/
report/ chap.tex
Logs.txt - Notepad
LogActivePrograms (Running) - Mi-
crosoft Visual C# 2010 Express
LogActivePrograms.EXE
TextPad - C:/Users/Documents/ re-
port/chap.tex
mouseLogger - Visual C++ 2008 Ex-
press Edition
May 29
10:09:49
2012
Google - Google Chrome Google - Google Chrome
LogActivePrograms (Running) - Mi-
crosoft Visual C# 2010 Express
LogActivePrograms.EXE
TextPad - C:/Users/Documents/ re-
port/chap.tex
intrusion detection using GUI behav-
ior.pdf - Adobe Reader
May 29
10:10:09
2012
Google Maps - Google
Chrome
LogActivePrograms (Running) - Mi-
crosoft Visual C# 2010 Express
LogActivePrograms.EXE
Google Maps - Google Chrome
the user behavior that will provide us with unique feature set for training and testing
various detection techniques.
3.4 The Event Logger Tool
We have implemented an event logger tool for capturing user behavior actions
based on mouse activity, keyboard activity and active applications that run on the
system for each user session. The reason for selecting these behavioral actions is
to create unique user profile based on the user’s interaction with the GUI-based
environment.
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In order to capture different behavioral interactions, via mouse and keyboard
interactions our tool needs to create certain lower level system hooks. Hooks are used
to extend the functionality of applications by intercepting function calls, events or
messages passed between software components. We created two system hooks for this
tool, a mouse hook and a keyboard hook. These hooks allowed us to intercept mouse
and keyboard event messages before they reach an application. More about the hooks
can be found in the Appendix A of the report.
This tool makes use of multithreaded programming to call the dll files using sep-
arate threads. This allows our logger to log various activities simultaneously. These
dll files contain the lower level hooks for the system. The logged events are observed
along with their start and end time to allow us to get maximum data possible.
Apart from capturing various user behavior actions, it is also important for us to
find a way of sending the large amount of captured user information from the user’s
machine to a server. Thus in order to facilitate this functionality, we implemented
the method to compress the collected data in a zip format and send the compressed
files to a common mail server at regular intervals.
This event logger is developed in C# language using Microsoft .Net framework on
Windows operating system. Through the C# program we call dll files written in C++.
These dll files contain keyboard and mouse hooks that are useful in logging keyboard
and mouse activities. We chose to use .Net framework as our project was focussed on
Windows operating system and .Net framework is easy to use with various Windows
components. Moreover, the ability to call lower level dll files from .Net framework is
very easy.
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CHAPTER 4
HMM-Based Intrusion Detector
The dataset created from the collected GUI-based user interaction from various
users is used for training HMM. However, in order to make the dataset from the
collected data files, the data needs to be first cleaned to remove the garbage data and
convert it in a format compatible with the HMM program.
4.1 Converting User Files To Dataset
For our project, we collect the user interactions with their systems in three dif-
ferent files based on the type of interaction. These files collect the information about
user interactions until the user restarts the system or until the system reconnects to
internet. Thus for each user session our mail server receives three separate files com-
pressed in a single file. Chapter 3 shows the type of information that is included in
each file. In addition to this information, the data files also contains a lot of garbage
in the form of characters, missing attributes or encrypted data. Therefore, in order
to use the data for training HMM we need to first clean the data. The steps involved
for cleaning the data are:
• The files are read line-by-line to search for the occurrence of useful user infor-
mation in each line.
• Extra characters, spaces and blank lines are ignored.
• Lines containing missing user information like timestamp or screen coordinates
in case of mouse clicks or type of key pressed in case of keyboard interaction
are ignored.
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4.2 Training HMM With Dataset
Once we have the dataset ready for HMM training, we divide it into two sets:
training set and testing set. For better results, it is always beneficial to have more
training data as compared to the testing data [18]. The training data comprises of
the data from good user and is used to generate models by HMM training. Multiple
models are generated using different data files for scoring test files. The testing data
comprises of the data from the good user that has not been used for training and
data from other users, which are considered as intruders here. The testing data from
the good user is used for the validation, to determine how good our model performs.
Ideally, if we score the testing data then we expect to get high score for the data from
the good user, and lower score for the data from the intruders.
4.3 Experimental Setup
For our experiment purpose, we have written the code for data cleaning and
training HMM in Java. We collected data from around 150 users, and have received
more than 50 files from each user. For training HMM, we download 50 files for the
randomly chosen good user and give the raw user files to our code as input. 20 files
of the chosen user is added to the training set and 30 files of the chosen user is added
to the testing set. Random files of the remaining users are also added to the testing
set.
For each file in the training set, a model file is generated in the model folder.
Therefore, we get 20 model files for the chosen user. First line of each model file gives
the details of the total number of observations (T), number of hidden states (N) and
number of unique observations (M) for that file. Remaining part of the file gives the
details of pi matrix, A matrix and B matrix of the HMM.
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Once the training phase completes, the testing files are scored and classified as
good user file or bad user file. The scores are computed using the model files and
are written in the result folder. We consider only those observations of the testing
file that fall under the same time limit of the good user file. Each result file contains
scores for all the files in the testing set. So we get 20 result files, one from each of the
model file.
4.4 Training HMM With Mouse And Keyboard Data
The data files of users is first cleaned to filter the useful information. In case of
mouse data information like types of mouse clicks (left or right) and x-y coordinates is
filtered, whereas in case of keyboard data information about keys pressed is retrieved
from the data files. For the mouse data, the screen is divided into 16 grids of size
16*16. The type of mouse click and the number of clicks in different grids is used as
observation matrix while training the HMM, whereas, in case of keyboard data the
set of keys pressed is used as observation matrix. The model files are then generated
for different number of hidden states. This completes the training phase of HMM.
For the testing phase, the model files are used for scoring the testing data.
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CHAPTER 5
Results
While training Hidden Markov Models, we have considered different number of
hidden states. Based on the scores of different users in the testing phase, we plotted
graphs for all the users. Our methodology and dataset was sufficient to effectively
separate the good users from the intruders with the help of the mouse logs. The
log likelihood per obeservation for good users and intruders were separated to a
significant extent for mouse data. However, the methodology was not that effective
with keyboard data as we will see in the following sections. The expected result from
HMM is to have lower scores for the good users and higher scores for bad users (i.e.,
intruders).
5.1 HMM Training With Mouse Logs
Let’s see the results of training HMM with our mouse data for a good user.
Figure 7 shows the results for a user with number of hidden states as 2. Whereas
Figure 8 shows results with number of hidden states as 3. The x-axis on the graphs
represent the user file number, whereas, the y-axis represent the log likelyhood score
of the user file. The graphs shows the separation of good users and intruders to a
significant extent, as the good users represented by blue dots are having lower scores
as compared to intruders.
However, there is still misclassification of some intruders as good users and vice
versa. When a intruder is misclassified as good user a false negative occurs, whereas
when a good user is misclassified as a intruder a false positive occurs. Thus, from
Figure 7 we can observe one false negatives and two false positive, if we take 200
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as the threshold score; whereas, Figure 8 shows two false negatives and one false
positive, if we take 150 as the threshold score.
Figure 7: Log likelihood per observation of user 1 Vs intruders using mouse data, N
= 2
Figure 8: Log likelihood per observation of user 1 Vs intruders using mouse data, N
= 3
We observe that by considering different threshold values, we can have different
number of false positives and false negatives. Hidden Markov Model utilizes this
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concept and classifies the user as good user and bad user (intruder) by using different
threshold values to compare the scores. Lower threshold values can result in more
number of false positives, whereas higher threshold values will reduce the number of
false positives but increase the number of false negatives.
Keeping in mind the importance of threshold value, we plotted the ROC curve
by considering each good/bad user’s scores as threshold value. Using each score as
threshold value allows us to cover all the possible scenarios of getting false positives
or false negatives.
Figure 9 depicts the ROC curve obtained for User 1’s results with number of
hidden states as 2, that was shown above in Figure 7. Area under the curve (AUC)
for this ROC is 0.93, that represents 93% accuracy of the method used here to dif-
ferentiate between good users and bad users. Whereas AUC for the ROC curve for
the same user with number of hidden states as 3 comes out as 0.9567. This curve is
shown in Figure 10.
On observing the results of HMM with different results, we find that the results
vary for each user. Figure 11 and Figure 12 shows the scatter plots of the scores of
user 18’s files and intruder files with hidden states as 2 and 3 respectively. On plotting
the ROC curves for these results (Figure 13 and Figure 14), we find that AUC for
the scores with hidden state as 2 is 0.9, while for hidden state as 3, the AUC is 0.94.
This variation in the results may be diagnosed as a result of the type of mouse usage
by different users. Some users are reluctant in using mouse for every purpose such as
copying and pasting images or text, they may be more accustomed to use keyboard
shortcut keys for such purposes. While there may be some users who are frequent
mouse users. Thus depending on various user behavioral parameters, the results of
HMM may vary.
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Figure 9: ROC curve for user 1, Mouse data, N = 2
Figure 10: ROC curve for user 1, Mouse data, N = 3
By looking at the area under the ROC curve for various users with different
number of hidden states, we can conclude that the HMM results are good for the
mouse logs. We find that all the ROC curves fall in the upper half of the graph which
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Figure 11: Log likelihood per observation of user 18 Vs intruders using mouse data,
N = 2
Figure 12: Log likelihood per observation of user 18 Vs intruders using mouse data,
N = 3
shows higher accuracy rate of the methodology in separating the good users and bad
users.
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Figure 13: ROC curve for user 18, Mouse data, N = 2
Figure 14: ROC curve for user 18, Mouse data, N = 3
5.2 HMM Training With Keyboard Logs
Similar methodology as with mouse logs, when applied to the keyboard logs
proved to be inefficient in separating the good users and bad users. Figure 15 and
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Figure 16 shows the scatterplot of the log likelihood per observation of good user vs
intruders with hidden states 2 and 3 respectively. The graphs indicates that the good
user and intruder’s scores are mingled up to a great extent. Looking at the graphs it
is difficult to identify the good user’s files and intruder’s files, as there is a significant
amount of overlap here.
Figure 15: Log likelihood per observation of user 1 Vs intruders using keyboard data,
N = 2
When ROC curves are plotted for these results, we get Figure 17 and Figure 18
for different hidden states. As can be guessed by looking at the curves, the AUC for
these ROC curves is calculated as 0.5975 and 0.555 respectively. As this AUC value
is very close to the random guess accuracy value (0.5), we can classify these results
as poor results.
However, when we combine the results of mouse logs and keyboard logs by dif-
ferent factors, we found that the combined score with 80% contribution of mouse logs
and 20% contribution of keyboard logs give us optimum results. Table 6 shows the
results of combining mouse scores and keyboard scores (with hidden state as 3) by
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Figure 16: Log likelihood per observation of user 1 Vs intruders using keyboard data,
N = 3
Figure 17: ROC curve for user 1, Keyboard data, N = 2
factors ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, with a difference of 0.1. The combinational formula
applied here is as follows:
Combined score = (a*Mouse score) + (b*Keyboard score)
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Figure 18: ROC curve for user 1, Keyboard data, N = 3
Table 6: Combining mouse and keyboard scores, N = 3
Mouse multiplier (a) Keyboard multiplier (b) Combined score
1.0 0.0 0.9385
0.9 0.1 0.9487
0.8 0.2 0.9538
0.7 0.3 0.9487
0.6 0.4 0.9487
0.5 0.5 0.9436
0.4 0.6 0.9410
0.3 0.7 0.9410
0.2 0.8 0.9410
0.1 0.9 0.9410
0.0 1.0 0.7487
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Intrusion detection on GUI-based operating systems is a research area which is
getting increasingly popular now with the introduction of more advanced GUI-based
features in the new operating systems. Along with high popularity, this research topic
is also an area which lacks a common platform for the researchers. After Schonalau
dataset became publicly available, all the research done on intrusion detection based
on Unix commands, had a common platform to showcase the effectiveness of their
methodologies used in the research. However, this is not same with intrusion detection
based on GUI commands. Our project was another step in bringing the research done
in this area to another level.
In our project, we came up with an event logging tool to capture the GUI-based
user data for Windows system. This user data was based on the mouse commands and
keyboard commands issued by the users in a user session. This tool was distributed
among various user groups of different demographics as well as residing in different
geographical areas around the globe. We trained the user data collected with the
machine learning technique, Hidden Markov Model (HMM). We trained both mouse
data as well as keyboard data with this methodology and found that the mouse data
was far more effective in intrusion detection, as compared to the keyboard data.
While results based on mouse data were good in separating good users from the
bad users and have an average accuracy rate of 91%, the keyboard data gave us results
equivalent to the random guess with an average of 53%. The reason behind this can
be several. This can be due to the variation in the keyboard types used by the users
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or the due to the presence of similar frequent keys pressed by the users.
We also analyzed our experimental results with different number of hidden states
in HMM and didn’t notice any significant change in the results. The accuracy level
of the experiments ran with different number of hidden states was found to be very
close. With mouse logs the accuracy level increased slightly with higher number of
hidden states, but the difference was no very significant.
Due to the time constraints and resource constraints, our project was mostly
concentrated on the mouse commands and keyboard commands issued by the users.
However, there are many other GUI features that can be taken in account for a better
intrusion detection. Based on the fact that we managed to get good results with the
limited data that we analysed, there can be much better results if future research
capture other GUI features as well for modeling user behavior.
Our event logging tool also captured the application names that were used by the
users during the user session. However, due to time constraints we could not study
the effect of mouse/keyboard commands in conjunction with the applications in use.
Future research work can definitely study the effect of application in use on the GUI
commands issued by the user, and analyze the results.
As there are many more devices available that have GUI-based operating systems
installed on them, for instance mobile phones, tablets, etc. This research can be
extended to these devices. Moreover, intrusion detection is also an important area
of research for banking and finance sector. Therefore, intrusion detection on fly can
also help customers using online banking and payment modes to feel more secure.
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APPENDIX
Hooks
A.1 Introduction
Hooks are the points in the system message-handling mechanism where applica-
tions intercepts the function calls, events or message traffic by installing some sub-
routine to monitor these messages and process them before they reach their target
software components. This hooking mechanism can be used to alter, augment or sim-
ply monitor the behavior of operating system, applications or software components.
These hools can be inserted at runtime provided the operating system grants the
process pemission to do so. Operating systems like Windows and Linux allow certain
hooks to process or modify system events. For instance, our tool uses keyboard and
mouse hooks available for Windows operating system. Similarly, Linux also provide
hooks to process network events within its kernel through NetFilter.
Although hooks are helpful in debugging and extending functionality. These have
their own downfalls as well. Due to the increase in processing time for each message,
hooks tend to slow down the system. Moreover, hooks are also used by malicious
code where certain outputs of the API calls are faked with the help of hooks.
A.2 Hook Procedures
Hook Procedures are the functions that intercept a particular type of event.
These are installed by calling SetWindowsHookEx function, which specifies the
type of hook, whether the procedure should be associated with all threads in the
same desktop as the calling thread or with a particular thread, and a pointer to the
procedure entry point. We used WH MOUSE LL and WH KEYBOARD LL
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hooks to install hook procedures that monitors low-level mouse and keyboard input
events respectively.
Once the hooks are installed and the event that is monitored occurs, the hook
procedure writes the information about the event to the client area of the application’s
main window. For instance, after installing the low level mouse hook, every time a new
mouse input event occurs the system calls LowLevelMouseProc callback function.
The type of mouse message, via left button click or mouse movement or right button
click, is identified by the parameter WPARAM of the callback function.
After processing the messages, it is important to release the hook procedure by
calling UnhookWindowsHookEx function. This allows the system’s processing
time to decrease and manages the resources efficiently.
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